An example of BashOperator in Airflow documentation suggested a way of passing dag_run.conf in the way that could cause unsanitized user input to be used to escalate privileges of UI user to allow exe
Apache Airflow's official documentation at `core-concepts/dag-run.html` ("Passing Parameters when triggering Dags") showed a verbatim `BashOperator(bash_command="echo value: {{ dag_run.conf['conf1'] }
An example dag `example_dag_decorator` had non-validated parameter that allowed the UI user to redirect the example to a malicious server and execute code on worker. This however required that the exa
The example example_xcom that was included in airflow documentation implemented unsafe pattern of reading value
from xcom in the way that could be exploited to allow UI user who had access to modify X
dag-factory is a library for Apache Airflow® to construct DAGs declaratively via configuration files. In versions 0.23.0a8 and below, a high-severity vulnerability has been identified in the cicd.yml
Example DAG: example_inlet_event_extra.py shipped with Apache Airflow version 2.10.0 has a vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker with only DAG trigger permission to execute arbitrary com
When a DAG failed during parsing, Airflow’s error-reporting in the UI could include the full kwargs passed to the operators. If those kwargs contained sensitive values (such as secrets), they might be
The partitioned_dag_runs endpoints in the Airflow UI enforced only asset-level access control, not per-Dag authorization. An authenticated UI/API user with global Asset:read permission could enumerate
Apache Airflow 2.4.0, and versions before 2.9.3, has a vulnerability that allows authenticated DAG authors to craft a doc_md parameter in a way that could execute arbitrary code in the scheduler conte
Dag Authors, who normally should not be able to execute code in the webserver context could craft XCom payload causing the webserver to execute arbitrary code. Since Dag Authors are already highly tru
Dag Authors, who normally should not be able to execute code in the webserver context could craft XCom payload causing the webserver to execute arbitrary code. Since Dag Authors are already highly tru
A user with access to the DB could craft a database entry that would result in executing code on Triggerer - which gives anyone who have access to DB the same permissions as Dag Author. Since direct D
Apache Airflow versions before 2.10.1 have a vulnerability that allows DAG authors to add local settings to the DAG folder and get it executed by the scheduler, where the scheduler is not supposed to
A bug in Apache Airflow's bulk Task Instances API (`PATCH/DELETE /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/dagRuns/{dag_run_id}/taskInstances`) evaluated authorization against the `dag_id` resolved from the URL path whil
API users via `/api/v2/dagReports` could perform Dag code execution in the context of the api-server if the api-server was deployed in the environment where Dag files were available.
The authenticated /ui/dags endpoint did not enforce per-DAG access control on embedded Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) and TaskInstance records: a logged-in Airflow user with read access to at least one DAG
Apache Airflow FAB Auth Manager contains an LDAP filter injection vulnerability (CWE-90) that allows unauthenticated attackers to exfiltrate directory data or bypass authentication. Upgrade to apache-
Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to 2.2.4, when Dagu is configured with HTTP Basic authentication (DAGU_AUTH_MODE=basic), all Server-Sent Events (SSE) endpoints are
Command injection in alerts in CoolerControl/coolercontrold <4.0.0 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code as root via injected bash commands in alert names
JWT Tokens used by tasks were exposed in logs. This could allow UI users to act as Dag Authors.
Users are advised to upgrade to Airflow version that contains fix.
Users are recommended to upgrade to
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