AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to 1.13.0, the filesystem-search-files agent skill passes its LLM-controlled pattern parameter to ripgrep as a positional argument without a -- end-of-options separator. ripgrep parses any argument that starts with - as an option, so a pattern of --pre=/bin/sh turns ripgrep into a script executor: it runs /bin/sh <file> for every file it walks. An attacker who can chat with an agent on a deployment with the filesystem plugin enabled (the default in the official Docker image) can use this, together with the sibling filesystem-write-text-file skill, to run arbitrary commands inside the AnythingLLM server container. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.13.0.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to 1.13.0, an approved mobile device token created in single-user mode can survive single-user -> multi-user migration even when the device record has userId = null. In multi-user mode, that stale token is still accepted by the mobile authentication middleware. Because no user is attached to the request, downstream mobile handlers fall back to unscoped data-access branches and return workspaces and workspace content without per-user filtering. This permits a pre-migration mobile token to enumerate a workspace assigned only to another user and retrieve victim-owned thread metadata and chat content in multi-user mode. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.13.0.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to 1.13.0, the AnythingLLM agent filesystem copy tool validates only the top-level source and destination paths. The recursive copy helper then descends into child entries using fs.stat() and copies files with fs.copyFile() without validating each child or rejecting symlinks. Because both APIs follow symlinks, a symlink nested inside an allowed source directory can point outside the allowed filesystem root and cause outside file contents to be copied into an allowed destination as a regular file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.13.0.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, GET /api/workspace/:slug/tts/:chatId in AnythingLLM returns the text-to-speech audio for another user's chat response within the same workspace because the route validates workspace membership but does not enforce ownership of the targeted chat row. As a result, an authenticated user can access another user's private assistant response in audio form if the chatId is known or guessed. This constitutes an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) affecting private chat response content exposed through the TTS endpoint. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.1.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt="..."` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.
A path traversal vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm versions up to and including 1.9.1, within the `AgentFlows` component. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of user input in the `loadFlow` and `deleteFlow` methods in `server/utils/agentFlows/index.js`. Specifically, the combination of `path.join` and `normalizePath` allows attackers to bypass directory restrictions and access or delete arbitrary `.json` files on the server. This can lead to information disclosure, such as leaking sensitive configuration files containing API keys, or denial of service by deleting critical files like `package.json`. The issue is resolved in version 1.12.1.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, The ImportedPlugin.importCommunityItemFromUrl() function in server/utils/agents/imported.js downloads a ZIP file from a community hub URL and extracts it using AdmZip.extractAllTo() without validating file paths within the archive. This enables a Zip Slip path traversal attack that can lead to arbitrary code execution.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, in multi-user mode, AnythingLLM blocks suspended users on the normal JWT-backed session path, but it does not block them on the browser extension API key path. If a user already has a valid brx-... browser extension API key, that key continues to work after suspension. As a result, a suspended user can still access browser extension endpoints, read reachable workspace metadata, and continue upload or embed operations even though normal authenticated requests are rejected.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, The two generic system-preferences endpoints allow manager role access, while every other surface that touches the same settings is restricted to admin only. Because of this inconsistency, a manager can call the generic endpoints directly to read plaintext SQL database credentials and overwrite admin-only global settings such as the default system prompt and the Community Hub API key.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, a SQL injection vulnerability in the built-in SQL Agent plugin allows any user who can invoke the agent to execute arbitrary SQL commands on connected databases. The getTableSchemaSql() method in all three database connectors (MySQL, PostgreSQL, MSSQL) constructs SQL queries using direct string concatenation of the table_name parameter without sanitization or parameterization.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, AnythingLLM Desktop contains a Streaming Phase XSS vulnerability in the chat rendering pipeline that escalates to Remote Code Execution on the host OS due to insecure Electron configuration. This works with default settings and requires no user interaction beyond normal chat usage. The custom markdown-it image renderer in frontend/src/utils/chat/markdown.js interpolates token.content directly into the alt attribute without HTML entity escaping. The PromptReply component renders this output via dangerouslySetInnerHTML without DOMPurify sanitization — unlike HistoricalMessage which correctly applies DOMPurify.sanitize().
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In 1.11.1 and earlier, On default installations where no password or API key has been configured, all HTTP endpoints and the agent WebSocket lack authentication, and the server's CORS policy accepts any origin. AnythingLLM Desktop binds to 127.0.0.1 (loopback) by default. Modern browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) implement Private Network Access (PNA). This explicitly blocks public websites from making requests to local IP addresses. Exploitation is only viable from within the same local network (LAN) due to browser-level blocking of public-to-private requests.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.10.0, a critical Path Traversal vulnerability in the DrupalWiki integration allows a malicious admin (or an attacker who can convince an admin to configure a malicious DrupalWiki URL) to write arbitrary files to the server. This can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) by overwriting configuration files or writing executable scripts. Version 1.10.0 fixes the issue.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. If AnythingLLM prior to version 1.10.0 is configured to use Qdrant as the vector database with an API key, this QdrantApiKey could be exposed in plain text to unauthenticated users via the `/api/setup-complete` endpoint. Leakage of QdrantApiKey allows an unauthenticated attacker full read/write access to the Qdrant vector database instance used by AnythingLLM. Since Qdrant often stores the core knowledge base for RAG in AnythingLLM, this can lead to complete compromise of the semantic search / retrieval functionality and indirect leakage of confidential uploaded documents. Version 1.10.0 patches the issue.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to commit e287fab56089cf8fcea9ba579a3ecdeca0daa313, the password recovery endpoint returns different error messages depending on whether a username exists, so enabling username enumeration. Commit e287fab56089cf8fcea9ba579a3ecdeca0daa313 fixes this issue.
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in AnythingLLM v1.8.5 in via the /api/workspaces endpoint. The endpoint fails to implement proper authentication checks, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to enumerate and retrieve detailed information about all configured workspaces. Exposed data includes: workspace identifiers (id, name, slug), AI model configurations (chatProvider, chatModel, agentProvider), system prompts (openAiPrompt), operational parameters (temperature, history length, similarity thresholds), vector search settings, chat modes, and timestamps.
A vulnerability in mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to version 1.2.2 allows for Prisma injection. The issue exists in the API endpoint "/embed/:embedId/stream-chat" where user-provided JSON is directly taken to the Prisma library's where clause. An attacker can exploit this by providing a specially crafted JSON object, such as {"sessionId":{"not":"a"}}, causing Prisma to return all data from the table. This can lead to unauthorized access to all user queries in embedded chat mode.
mintplex-labs/anything-llm version git 6dc3642 contains an unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the API for the embeddable chat functionality. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a malformed JSON payload to the API endpoint, causing a server crash due to an uncaught exception. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.2.
A vulnerability in the normalizePath function in mintplex-labs/anything-llm version git 296f041 allows for path traversal, leading to arbitrary file read and write in the storage directory. This can result in privilege escalation from manager to admin. The issue is fixed in version 1.2.2.
In mintplex-labs/anything-llm v1.5.11 desktop version for Windows, the application opens server port 3001 on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication by default. This vulnerability allows an attacker to gain full backend access, enabling them to perform actions such as deleting all data from the workspace.