CVE-2026-6720
Description
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.
CVSS Details
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X Threat Intelligence
Weaknesses 1
References 4
- github.com https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12535
- github.com https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12536
- github.com https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12537
- tigera.io https://www.tigera.io/security-bulletins/tta-2026-003/
Remediation
No remediation data recorded yet
Check vendor advisories and the NVD entry for patch availability.