Description

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) decoder. The function decode_bgp_subnet_encoding_ipv4_raw() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp reads prefix_bit_length directly from the BGP packet (line 99) without validating it is <= 32 for IPv4 prefixes. This value is passed to how_much_bytes_we_need_for_storing_certain_subnet_mask() which computes ceil(prefix_bit_length / 8), returning up to 32 bytes for a prefix_bit_length of 255. The result is used as the length argument to memcpy() (line 106), which copies into a 4-byte uint32_t stack variable (prefix_ipv4). This causes a stack buffer overflow of up to 28 bytes, which can be exploited for arbitrary code execution. Additionally, the unvalidated prefix_bit_length is passed to convert_cidr_to_binary_netmask_local_function_copy() (line 111), where a shift of (32 - cidr) with cidr > 32 causes undefined behavior.

Weaknesses 2

Affected Products 1

References 3

• github.com https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon
  Product
• github.com https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon/blob/master/src/bgp_protocol.cpp
  Product
• lorikeetsecurity.com https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48686-bgp-nlri-stack-overflow
  Third Party Advisory

Remediation