Description

Module: plugins/modules/nexmo.py CVSS 3.1: 6.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Issue: api_key and api_secret are declared no_log=True at the input level, but both credentials are immediately URL-encoded into a GET request as query parameters, bypassing all no_log protection. Vulnerable Code (lines 82-93): msg = { "api_key": module.params.get("api_key"), "api_secret": module.params.get("api_secret"), "from": module.params.get("src"), "text": module.params.get("msg"), } url = f"{NEXMO_API}?{urlencode(msg)}" response, info = fetch_url(module, url, headers=headers) Observed Output: https://rest.nexmo.com/sms/json?api_key=a1b2c3d4&api_secret=MyS3cr3tK3y!!&from=AnsibleBot&to=15551234567&text=Hello Exposure Vectors: Ansible verbose output (-vvv) logs the full request URL Vonage/Nexmo server access logs record credentials in query string HTTP proxies, SIEM, and network inspection tools capture the full URL AWX/Automation Controller network debug logs Fix: Switch to POST with credentials in the request body: data = urlencode({"api_key": api_key, "api_secret": api_secret, "from": src, "to": number, "text": msg}) fetch_url(module, NEXMO_API, data=data, method="POST", headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})

Weaknesses 1

References 2

• access.redhat.com https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11820
• bugzilla.redhat.com https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488970

Remediation